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International military position of a country may primarily be described in 
quantitative categories. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, there are 
several factors which condition this assessment. The most important ones seem to be: 
external and internal threats for a state’s national security, including non-military 
threats, mainly of cross-border nature, international military stature of the United 
States of America, historical and cultural background, the role that the army plays 
in home affairs, modernization of armed forces, new types of combat missions or 
military operations, and geographical conditions. This paper analyzes the standings 
of land, air, and naval forces, as well as paramilitary formations in Latin America 
and the Caribbean in the period between 2008–2020.
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RESUMEN 
La posición militar internacional de un Estado puede describirse principalmente en 
categorías cuantitativas. En el caso de la región de América Latina y el Caribe, hay 
también otros determinantes que influyen en la evaluación de la posición militar de 
los países. Los más importantes parecen ser: las amenazas externas e internas a la 
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Artículos y ensayos seguridad nacional, incluidas las amenazas no militares de carácter transfronterizo, 
la posición militar internacional de los Estados Unidos de América, el contexto 
histórico y cultural, el papel de los militares en la política interna, la modernización 
del ejército, las nuevas tareas de las fuerzas armadas y las condiciones geográficas. 
En este artículo se analizará la posición de las fuerzas terrestres, aéreas, navales, 
así como de las formaciones paramilitares de los países de la región en el período 
2008–2020. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: América Latina y el Caribe, posición militar, fuerzas terrestres, 
fuerzas aéreas, fuerzas navales, formaciones paramilitares. 
Introduction
In this article we are going to describe the military stature of the countries 
of Latin America and the Caribbean1 in the years 2008–20202. Due to space 
limitations, the detailed description of the armed forces had to be omitted (In-
ternational Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) only include some of the countries). 
The present article is predominantly descriptive, and it is written from the 
point of view of comparison of the countries in the region. What is more, in 
the case of the Caribbean sub-region we only took into account specific coun-
tries. It must be born in mind that the specificity of the region in question 
conditions the description of the military position of the countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The issue revolving around the analysis of a new 
role that military personnel play in domestic policy (political systems) has 
only been signaled here since the core of the whole matter of this work focuses 
on the  comparison of the military position of these countries. We have analy-
zed the armed forces in the following order: land, air, naval and paramilitary 
forces. Only the basic types of equipment were included in the analysis sin-
ce personal weapons and light armament are virtually incomparable because 
they are not included in any available statistical data.
The decision to present only the international military stature in the Latin 
America and the Caribbean region, without comparing it to countries from 
other regions, especially the United States, was made consciously – the excep-
tion being the involvement in the United Nations peacekeeping operations.
The international military stature of a given country may primarily be des-
cribed in quantitative categories. Qualitative factors are, in effect, extremely 
difficult or completely impossible to measure. Moreover, their change dyna-
1  The notion and borders of the region, see: K. Krzywicka, 2009, pp. 211–216; The Military 
Balance 2020, 2020, pp. 532–533.
2  Due to the data availability, points relating to the military expenditure, export and import 
of military equipment will be characterized in the period between 2008–2019.
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mics is quite significant. To these dynamic variations belong: professionalism 
in the army and its ethnic and religious structure, which is reflected in the 
army’s ability to endure suffering and the society’s will to fight (Topolski, 2004, 
pp. 22–23).
The aim of this work is to provide a concise summary of the military stren-
gth of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. In doing so, we have 
adopted the following hypotheses:
1. Land forces and paramilitary formations exert the greatest influence on the 
aggregate military standing of the Latin American and Caribbean countries.
2. Brazil occupies the first place in the region as far as the military strength goes.
Conditions relating to the military position 
of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean
In the case of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, several condi-
tions, which greatly impact their capabilities, need to be considered. This di-
rectly translates into the military position of a country in the region. The first 
condition included in our analysis is the external and internal threat to the 
security of a country. These threats trigger numerous contradictions since, on 
the one hand, a region may be described as stable or as the one in which the 
possibility of an international, armed conflict outbreak is relatively low. Ac-
cording to the provisions of the Tlatelolco Treaty, signed in 1967 (it took effect 
in 1969), Latin America is a zone free of nuclear weapons. At the same time, 
there exist multiple territorial and border disputes which could be defined as 
long-standing They date back to the decolonization period and the process of 
forming independent countries in the first part of the 19th century, as well as 
the influence of the then Creole elites on the subsequent forming of borders. 
These disputes are of sub-regional nature and they do not pose any direct mi-
litary threat. However, they might potentially stir an armed conflict. The most 
significant ones include:
a) Venezuela and Guyana territorial dispute with Colombia over Esequiba 
(approximately 142 000 km2),
b) the issue of Bolivia’s access to the Pacific Ocean – dispute with Chile,
c) the Falkland Islands sovereignty dispute between Argentina and Great 
Britain,
d) border disputes in Central America (Belize–Guatemala) (Kruijt, 2017, 
pp.  7–9; Goldblat, 1994, pp. 326–342; Krzywicka, 2012c, pp. 17–18; 
Lisińska, 2017, pp. 529–532; Czerny, 2015, pp. 37–39; Czerny and Czerny, 
2017b, pp. 47–49; Czerny and Czerny, 2017a, p. 183; Łaciński, 2017, p. 9; 
Tulchin, 2019, p. 93).
Secondly, the USA maintains an indisputable, world military power po-
sition compared to the countries in the region. In case of a direct military 
engagement with Latin American countries, their armies would be beaten 
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Artículos y ensayos quickly by the American forces (Kruijt, 2017, p. 11; Łaciński, 2017, p. 15). 
Furthermore, the strategic importance of the Panama Canal to the USA needs 
to be indicated here (Czerny, 2015, p. 42).
Thirdly, in Latin America and the Caribbean, there are internally moti-
vated, non-military threats, which are mainly of cross-border nature. Con-
sequently, not only do they constitute a major threat for the internal security 
of a considerable number of countries in this region, but they also pose risk 
region-wide. These include:
a) organized crime (also cross-border crime which includes private-run 
armies of criminals) – this is proven by the world highest rate of crime 
and violence committed (including the number of murders) per 100 000 
inhabitants. They are largely connected with bloodletting and gang rivalry, 
for instance drug cartels. These structures focus on drug trafficking (which 
is the biggest cross-border issue), human trafficking, arms trade, mass theft 
and kidnappings. To some extent, the above issues concern all countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.
b) the activity of various non-public entities of paramilitary nature, including 
guerillas, which control parts of a country’s territory, for example, Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)3 and National Liberation 
Army (ELN) in Colombia or Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) in Peru. 
These entities also comprise self-defense and private militia forces, as well 
as narcoparamilitares formations. These structures are directly or indi-
rectly related to the “narcotrafficking industry” from which they benefit 
financially, for example, in exchange for offering “paid protection”. What 
is more, these organizations also use violence towards citizens/inhabitants, 
which, in turn, causes migrations or even mass migrations (Kruijt, 2017, 
pp. 20, 25–27; Martynov and Moloeznik, 2017, pp. 184–192; Lisińska, 2017, 
pp. 529–538, 541; Hinz, 2019, pp. 21–23; Gil, 2012, pp. 116–122; Łaciński, 
2012, pp. 11–13; Derwich, 2019, pp. 143–146; Czerny, 2012, pp. 31–43; 
Czerny and Czerny, 2017b, pp. 49–50).
Countries in the region face huge problems dealing with the high rate of 
violence and armed crime (Hinz, 2019, pp. 21–23). In addition, guerillas ope-
rate on a relatively uninhabited and backcountry areas, which makes it ex-
tremely difficult for the state’s forces (including state’s armed forces) to take 
control over them (Lisińska, 2017, pp. 532–534).
The third group comprises historical and cultural considerations. Here, the 
role of the then leaders and armies in gaining independence by the countries 
in the region needs to be mentioned. The fierce destruction of Spanish colonial 
administration led to the disintegration of power structure and the advent of 
3  On the 15th of August 2017, the Colombian government officially announced that the 
conflict with FARC, whose armed forces surrendered their weapons to the UN representatives, 
ended. However, the way the treaty was implemented posed a problem (see Biczyńska, 2019, 
pp. 126–128).
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“political void”. This gap was filled by the army which at the same time became 
the guarantor of a country’s existence. Charismatic leaders – caudillos – de-
scending from military ranks took power in the state. In Latin America people 
started to believe that the army and its “powerful men” are the guarantors of 
internal stability while civil elites did not rise to the occasion and were not able 
to deal with governing the country. In the vein of patriotism and adopted edu-
cational system, people were convinced that the armed forces are on a historic 
mission to defend the state and nation against internal and external threats. 
From the army’s perspective, whenever civil politicians endangered the na-
tional interest, or state security, there had to be a military reaction. Armed 
forces “had custody” but de facto controlled civil authorities so that they could 
“save” their homeland, if need be. Later, this phenomenon was also related to 
exercising power by the army, both directly and indirectly. Still, armed forces 
endeavored to preserve the existing domestic order and even introduce es-
sential reforms of the state (Kruijt, 2017, pp. 9–17; Krzywicka, 2012b, pp. 15–
16, 22–23; Krzywicka, 2012c, p. 18; Stelmach, 2012, pp. 127–130; Krzywicka, 
2012a, pp. 51–68; Trefler, 2007, pp. 64–70; Trefler, 2014, pp. 10–750; Łaciński, 
2012, pp. 35–41; Gocłowska–Bolek, 2019, pp. 10–11; Hinz, 2019, p. 19).
Another aspect is the role of the military. The nature of armed forces is 
related to the domestic and foreign policy of a country. It also involves the re-
lationship between “a politician” and “a serviceman”. Even more so, it involves 
the influence the army (active and retired personnel) may have on authorities. 
The burning issue of civil and democratic state control over the armed forces 
and other military structures needs to be addressed here. It is a rather complex 
issue since, despite democratic control over the army, in some countries of 
the region the army maintained a kind of “autonomy”. Besides, domestic pro-
blems, such as high crime level and poverty, undermined civil politicians’ trust 
and credibility. The “longing” for stability, powerful authority, and charismatic 
leaders seems to explain why the army and their members (both active and 
retired personnel) are so popular among the society. In some countries, as 
a result of democratic election, presidency was assumed by people connected 
with or descending from the army. These officers acting as politicians, often 
referred to as “politicians in uniforms”, have also become a part of political 
elites, including political parties. What is more, active or retired army officers 
fill various offices in the state power structure and local administration. They 
also hold high positions in economic sectors (e.g. in Venezuela). Summing up, 
the army and its most important leaders or retired, yet still connected with 
the military environment servicemen, exert great influence on politics both 
directly and indirectly, thus dominating civil institutions, despite the opera-
tion of law which clearly lays down that civil power has authority over the 
armed forces (Kruijt, 2017, pp. 21–24; Krzywicka, 2012b, pp. 14, 19–23; Tre-
fler, 2007, pp. 64–70; Olszanecka, 2018, p. 175; Stelmach, 2019, pp. 195–205; 
Stelmach, 2012, pp. 133, 143–144; Hinz, 2019, pp. 20–21, 25–26). According 
to the Latinobarómetro survey, the inhabitants of Latin America put their 
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2016), the police (35%), and finally, political parties (merely 13%). The grea-
test support for the armed forces was reported in Uruguay (62%), Ecuador 
(61%) and Brazil (58%) while the least support for the army was reported in 
Venezuela (19%), Nicaragua (22%) and El Salvador (27%) (Latinobarómetro, 
2018, pp. 47–50).
Another thing that must be borne in mind is that the armed forces of Latin 
America and the Caribbean are gradually being modernized. For one thing, 
it can be attributed to the fact that the countries are replacing outdated, obso-
lete military equipment, but also, this process is triggered by the neighboring 
countries’ arms procurements. This phenomenon can be observed in the case 
of: Venezuela – Colombia and Brazil, Chile – Peru and Bolivia, Peru – Ecuador 
(Krzywicka, 2012c, pp. 17–18; Łaciński, 2017, p. 14; Maroszek, 2009, pp. 6–11).
Another issue revolves around the army’s new array of combat missions in 
the region, for instance, the fight against domestic enemy, i.e. anti-government 
groups (Kruijt, 2017, p. 9). Armed forces fulfil tasks which are more of the 
constabulary nature. The army’s engagement in fighting the organized crime, 
especially drug cartels inter alia in Mexico or Colombia, is meant to provide 
domestic security for instance in Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. New combat operations of the armed forces 
are primarily meant to:
a) guarantee domestic security,
b) be used as auxiliary police forces,
c) be used while fighting internal threats such as terrorists or organized crime,
d) be used as intervention forces – for instance to suppress slums areas. (Krui-
jt, 2017, pp. 25–28; Lisińska, 2017, pp. 534–538; Krzywicka, 2012c, p. 18; 
Stelmach, 2012, pp. 141–144).
These missions are accompanied by the militarization of the police through 
building up special police formations which are heavily armed and trained to 
fight in town areas. As a result, the difference between a traditional national 
defense and internal security might not be so easy to discern.
Participation of the armed forces in social development of a country can 
be said to perform another crucial function. It encompasses: health care and 
dental care, educational, hospital, road and environmental infrastructure 
(Stelmach, 2019, pp. 201, 204–205; Stelmach, 2012, pp. 127–128; Krzywicka, 
2012b, pp. 5, 14–18, 22–23).
Last but not least, geographical conditions in which a country is locat-
ed, its lie of a land, climate, vegetation cover, precipitation, potamic (river) 
system and the shape of borders are all things to be considered in the dis-
cussion. The Latin American region is widely diversified as far as geographi-
cal features are concerned. There are large countries (Brazil), big countries 
(Argentina, Mexico), medium-sized countries (Peru), small countries (Cen-
tral America), as well as micro-countries (the Caribbean sub-region). Even 
though the region is predominantly lowland, the Central America sub-region 
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is mainly mountainous. North American Cordillera range which traverses the 
sub-region from Panama to Mexico is disjointed and features steep moun-
tainsides. Further south, the Andes mountain range extends. Its considerable 
height differences determine the climate diversification. In Latin America and 
the Caribbean, there are all climate zones, i.e. equatorial climate zone (very 
moist), sub-tropical climate zone (moist), wet and dry tropical climate zones, 
both continental (dry) and marine sub-tropical zones, moderate climate 
zone and finally circumpolar and subpolar zones. Vegetation cover is varied 
because the Amazon rainforest is a region featuring equatorial forests, and 
Central America is covered in thick, difficult to travel forests. In some parts 
of the region there are mixed coniferous and deciduous forests, savannahs, 
steppes, deserts, semi-deserts, and alpine vegetation. The region also features 
a well-developed potamic (river) system. Since a lot of the areas in the region 
are almost inaccessible, this system plays a vital role as far as communication 
routes are concerned. Thus, frequently the only possible means of transport 
is via rivers or small planes (Czerny, 2015, pp. 37–52; Czerny and Czerny, 
2017b, pp. 47–49; Czerny and Czerny, 2017a, pp. 187–188; Mata and Campos, 
2001, pp. 695–716). In Latin America, land and maritime borders are long, 
for instance, the border between Brazil and Venezuela (2,199 km), Colom-
bia and Venezuela (2,219 km). They run along the mountain ridges, rivers, 
areas covered by rainforest, or through desert terrain – the borders are partly 
natural. Moreover, these borders run through uninhabited areas or through 
areas where the population density is rather low, too. Far-flung from the main 
business and political life centers, cross-border areas are peripherally located, 
which results in road infrastructure being poorly developed. In addition, their 
isolation is deepened by the environmental conditions. Limited supervision of 
the countries (or its absence) over these areas makes it possible for the illegal 
activity of various entities related to organized crime to be undertaken (by 
drug cartels but also paramilitary armed forces) (Czerny and Czerny, 2017b, 
pp. 42, 47–50; Czerny and Czerny, 2017a, pp. 183, 191; Łaciński, 2017, pp. 11–
12). Nevertheless, in some countries, economic resources in the cross-border 
areas are being allocated with the aim of increasing the mobility of the army, as 
well as establishing military facilities and depots (Czerny, 2015, pp. 48).
To sum up, national armed forces are subject to governmental control 
when domestic threats are low and international threats are high. First, the 
region in question is largely dominated by domestic threats, which affects the 
procurement of proper military equipment. Secondly, in some countries of the 
region, there is a deficit of effective civil control over the armed forces. Thirdly, 
high-ranked officers and retired servicemen exert influence on the decision-
making process in terms of domestic politics and national security. Fourthly, 
the army think that it is their duty to protect national interest and sovereignty, 
and that they are obliged to intervene when its security is breached, according 
to them. It needs to be stressed at this point that the function of the armed 
forces representatives is extremely significant. In the second decade of the 21st 
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personnel on interior policy, as well as their involvement in socioeconomic 
development of the countries. Furthermore, due to the landform and climatic 
conditions, as well as a lack of infrastructure in the region, it is impossible to 
make full use of modern, offensive weapon systems. All the above-mentioned 
issues directly influence the military expenditure and development of military 
capability of the countries in the region which, in turn, translates into the mili-
tary position of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (Krzywicka, 
2012c, pp. 17–18; Maroszek, 2009, pp. 6–11; Spyra, 2019, p. 189). It also needs 
mentioning that climatic conditions have an impact on military equipment 
and logistic support, i.e. army supply lines. The big issue for the army seems 
to be the ability to have proper equipment, resistant to extreme weather con-
ditions, at their disposal.
Land forces ranking
In this part of the article we have included the Armed Forces of Cooperation 
(National Guard) in Venezuela in the total of Venezuelan armed forces since, 
officially, they are an integral part of the army; its equivalent cannot be found 
in other countries of the region, though (The Military Balance 2008, 2008, p. 
98; The Military Balance 2009, 2009, pp. 450–451; The Military Balance 2010, 
2010, pp. 465–466; The Military Balance 2011, 2011, pp. 474–475; The Mili-
tary Balance 2012, 2012, pp. 470–471; The Military Balance 2013, 2013, pp. 
551–552; The Military Balance 2014, 2014, pp. 489–490; The Military Balance 
2015, 2015, pp. 487–488; The Military Balance 2016, 2016, pp. 487–488; The 
Military Balance 2017, 2017, pp. 556–557; The Military Balance 2018, 2018, 
pp. 505–506; The Military Balance 2019, 2019, pp. 516–517; The Military Ba-
lance 2020, 2020, pp. 532–533.). It is worth noting that Costa Rica and Panama 
have not been included in this compilation because they do not have an army 
– just paramilitary formations.
According to the IISS, the military position of the countries in Latin Ame-
rica and the Caribbean between 2008–2020 was greatly diversified. Brazil has 
the most numerous army – approximately 318,000–368,000 soldiers. Second 
place was occupied by Colombia whose armed forces amounted to 254,000–
297,000 soldiers. Mexico holds the third place with 236,000–280,000 of army 
personnel. Venezuela is in the fourth place with 115,000–123,000 soldiers, fo-
llowed by Peru with 81,000–115,000 soldiers. However, between 2011–2015 
this country had almost the same number of soldiers as Venezuela. As for 
the further ranks in the compilation, in the analyzed period, their positions 
kept changing, which stemmed from the fact that the headcount of these ar-
mies was increased or decreased. The next two places belong to Argentina 
(number 6 in 2008–2017 with 73,000–76,000 soldiers, number 7 since 2018 
with 74,000 personnel) and Chile (number 6 since 2018 with 77,000 soldiers, 
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number 7 between 2008–2017 with 59,000–65,000 soldiers). Analyzing pla-
ces 8–11 in the compilation it can be observed that significant changes took 
place in the case of 4 countries: Ecuador (40,000–58,000 soldiers), the Domi-
nican Republic (25,000–56,000), Cuba (49,000) and Bolivia (34,000–46,000). 
The remaining countries, namely: Uruguay (21,000–25,000 soldiers), El Sal-
vador (15,000–25,000) and Guatemala (15,000–18  000) occupied places 12 
to 14. Honduras (11,000–15,000), Paraguay (11,000–14,000) and Nicaragua 
(12,000–4,000) had slightly smaller armies at their disposal. Jamaica (3,000–
6,000 soldiers), Trinidad and Tobago (3,000–4,000), Guyana (1,000–3,000), 
Belize (1,000–2,000), Surinam (2,000), the Bahamas and Barbados (1,000 sol-
diers each) – in the case of these two countries the numbers have been roun-
ded up to a thousand (000), Antigua and Barbuda (200) and Haiti (0–2,700, 
between 2009–2019 – around 150 soldiers) possess armies which are relatively 
smaller numerically, see Table 1.
In the case of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Argentina, the Do-
minican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Haiti in 
the analyzed period of time there have been instances of both increasing and 
decreasing the army personnel, whereas in Venezuela, Paraguay, Jamaica, Tri-
nidad and Tobago, Guyana and Belize only increase in the number of soldiers 
can be noted. In Cuba, Surinam, the Bahamas, Barbados, Antigua and Barbu-
da, armies remained at the same level numerically. Three countries, i.e. Boli-
via, Uruguay and Nicaragua, had their army personnel reduced. Comparing 
2008 to 2020, it shows that the number of soldiers increased in Colombia, Ve-
nezuela, Chile, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Paraguay, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Belize. The reduction of 
army personnel occurred in Brazil, Mexico, Peru, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
Uruguay, and Nicaragua. At this point Brazil needs a special mention since in 
2020 the number of soldiers in the army reached almost the same number as 
in 2008. Also, it must be noted that Mexico’s army numbers decreased due to 
the establishment of the National Guard, to which various types of armed for-
ces were incorporated by president Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (Derwich, 
2019, p. 146), see Table 1.
The main purpose of participating in the UN peacekeeping operations was 
to strengthen international position of the countries involved (Stelmach, 2012, 
p. 142). Taking a closer look at the involvement of the countries of the region 
in these missions, two conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, 19 countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean participated, which is a commanding number. No-
netheless, holistic participation of army and police personnel was considerably 
lower than that of the leader’s in this category, and apart from the year 2017, per-
sonnel involved in the United Nation’s Stabilizing Mission in Haiti – MINUS-
TAH.  In the scale of UN, it constituted between 6.6% (in 2010) to almost 8% 
(2011) between 2008–2014. A major decrease was noted between 2015–2017 
(4.2–5.6%). We would like to emphasize the fact that until 2018 the participation 
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Artículos y ensayos tely 2.4–3%. In the case of Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Costa 
Rica, and Cuba it was merely symbolic, while in the case of Jamaica, Mexico, 
Colombia, Honduras and Ecuador it could be described as low. At the opposite 
extreme, Uruguay – which may be treated as a leader in the region – needs to be 
mentioned. The leading countries also comprise Brazil (2008–2017), Argentina 
(2008–2015), and, to a lesser degree, Chile (2008–2017), Bolivia (2008–2015), 
as well as Paraguay (2011–2017). In the case of Peru and Guatemala, the level 
of involvement varied in the analyzed period. El Salvador, which as the only 
country significantly increased the army and police personnel participation in 
the UN operations, is an exception to the regional background. In 2020, it was 
only preceded by Uruguay (see Table 2 for reference).
Secondly, the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean most acti-
vely participated in MINUSTAH. Their contribution should be considered as 
significant, especially in the period between 2013–2015 when it amounted to 
53–53.4% of the total number of personnel involved in the operation. In other 
periods of time, it remained at the level ranging from 44.4% to 48.2%. After the 
termination of MINUSTAH, between October 2017 – October 2019, within 
the United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti – MINUJUSTH, the 
involvement of the countries of the region was merely symbolic (see Table 2). 
To sum up, the participation of army and police personnel from Latin Ameri-
ca and the Caribbean in the UN operations in the period between 2008–2020 
was directly related to their involvement in MINUSTAH, the exception here 
being Uruguay – one of the greatest contributors.
Land forces constitute the most important component of the armed forces 
of Latin America and the Caribbean, the exception being the armed forces of 
the Bahamas which only comprise the naval component (The Military Balance 
2020, 2020, p. 401). Determining the military ranking of land forces in the 
region requires, on the one hand, to include the headcount of the personnel. 
On the other hand, though, one also must take into the account the basic 
level of equipment, mainly the so-called heavy weapons. According to IISS, 
in 2020 Brazil, Colombia and Mexico overwhelmingly dominate the region 
as far as the number of soldiers is concerned. The position of Venezuela is 
worth noting as well – although its land forces are considerably smaller than 
the top three (nearly 2.6 times smaller than Colombia, 2.5 times smaller than 
Brazil and over twice smaller than Mexican forces), its position in the region is 
still strong. Comparing Venezuelan army to the other countries’ armies in the 
region, it can be observed that its army is 1.8 times bigger than the Peruvian 
forces, and its advantage is much larger compared to Belize or Surinam (57–61 
times). Lower positions in the ranking belong to Peru, Chile, Argentina, and 
Cuba. The Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Bolivia, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Uruguay, and Nicaragua have numerically inferior armies. Paraguay, Hondu-
ras, Jamaica possess relatively minor forces, followed by Guyana, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Belize, Surinam whose land forces are even less numerous. Barbados, 
Haiti, Antigua and Barbuda’s land forces are rather symbolic (see Table 3).
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The situation is much more complex when we include the criterion of 
major equipment categories, that is – heavy weapons. The greatest estimated 
number of tanks and anti-aircraft systems belong to Cuba. This country also 
owns a large number of artillery (number 3 in the ranking), and armored ve-
hicles. In the case of Cuba, though, it must be stated that a large part of this 
equipment was made in the Soviet Union and dates back to 40s, 50s, 60s of the 
20th century (The Military Balance 2020, 2020, p. 416). Antigua and Barbuda, 
Barbados and Haiti did not have any military equipment of even basic cate-
gories. Regionwide, countries occupying lowest positions in the ranking are 
Belize, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. Another group comprises 
countries such as Jamaica, Paraguay, and Honduras where, despite the dispro-
portion in the number of army personnel or equipment, the military capability 
is moderately low. In the case of the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, El Salva-
dor, Guatemala, and Uruguay the level of military capability is below average, 
while Bolivia and Ecuador are close to average. Taking into the consideration 
both headcount of the armies and basic military equipment categories, Peru, 
Argentina, and Chile’s military capabilities in the region can be described as 
average, which corresponds to the position of their land forces in the compi-
lation. In the case of Venezuela, Mexico and Colombia, substantial military 
capabilities are to be observed, which is reflected in their high position in the 
ranking. The position of a leader belongs to Brazil, which outweighs other 
countries in the region as far as major military equipment goes and has only 
slightly lower number of army personnel than Colombia (see Table 3).
Considering the wholistic military capability of Brazil, Venezuela, and to 
a smaller extent, Peru, Chile, and Argentina, it can be concluded that land 
forces of these countries enable them to take defensive and offensive military 
actions. Interestingly, in the case of Colombia, whose army if often referred to 
as “one large infantry regiment”, and Mexico, land forces are mainly of defensi-
ve nature or they are destined to perform intervention/pacification operations 
within their territories (for instance operations against irregular forces and, to 
a smaller extent, operations outside their borders). As far as other countries 
are concerned (excluding Cuba), their land forces enable them to take various 
defensive actions.
Air force ranking
On the regional scale, air force does not constitute the main component of the 
armies of Latin America and the Caribbean. According to IISS, air force ca-
pability of the region was quite varied. Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Haiti, 
the Bahamas do not possess this type of armed forces. Considering qualitative 
and quantitative factors, Belize, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Jamaica, and 
Nicaragua did not have any air force, whereas Surinam, Guatemala owned 
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Artículos y ensayos their position in the region was merely symbolic. The Air Force of the Domi-
nican Republic, Paraguay and Uruguay has only a small number of aircraft 
available (not in the multi-role combat aircraft/fighter category, though). The 
air forces of the above–mentioned 14 countries are not capable of indepen-
dently protecting their territory from aerial attack. Honduras, El Salvador, and 
Bolivia also exhibited a very limited air force capability. The position of these 
three countries could be described as low in the region, yet it is much higher 
than e.g. Belize or Jamaica or any country from that group. Argentina, Ecua-
dor, Cuba, and Mexico have much greater capability including combat aircra-
ft, helicopters, and anti-aircraft. However, Argentina and Mexico did not pos-
sess multi-role aircraft and the technical condition of Cuba’s aircraft is hard to 
determine and some of its inventory is definitely obsolete. Basing the analysis 
on qualitative and quantitative factors, these countries reached a rather me-
diocre position in the ranking. The capability of Colombia could be said to 
be average, while Peru, Chile, and Venezuela place slightly higher, reaching 
the position of moderately high level of capability. The deciding components 
in these cases seem to be related to the quantity and quality of equipment. In 
the case of Venezuela, the great number of anti-aircraft is worth noticing. As 
for the aircraft capability, Brazil is at the top of the list, compared to the other 
countries (see Table 4). Brazilian forces’ main asset is their offensive potential, 
yet this country does not have modern multi-role aircraft. Those are owned by 
Peru, Chile, and Venezuela (several dozen units each) (The Military Balance 
2020, 2020, pp. 398–441). The relevant question concerns the technical condi-
tion of aircraft in respective countries. Secondly, air force is mainly prepared 
to carry out operations within its own territory, to support land forces and, to 
some extent, to attack non-public, armed military formations. Only a few of 
the countries can counter modern aircraft of a potential enemy. In conclusion, 
a few of Latin America and the Caribbean’s countries, particularly Colombia, 
Argentina, Brazil4 (and, to a smaller extent, Chile, Peru and Ecuador) in order 
to strengthen the air force need modern combat aircraft – especially multi-
role aircraft, which requires a lot of financial resources.
Naval forces ranking
For countries located in Latin America and the Caribbean naval forces – both 
of military and police nature – play a particularly important role. Bolivia and 
Paraguay do not have access to the sea, still, they own this type of forces ope-
rating on rivers. Belize, Costa Rica, and Panama only maintain paramilitary 
formations. It should be noted that in countries of the region the naval forces 
4  Brazil signed a contract with Sweden by means of which it purchased 36 multi-role fight-
ers of JAS 39E/F type Gripen (Gripen NG). They will start gradually being introduced to the 
Brazilian air force from 2021 (see Brazil Air Force, 2015).
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Argentina 12,90 42/114 39/– 88 –
Belize NDA –/3 3/– – –
Bolivia 6,50 22/118 36/– 18+
Brazil 67,50 209/612 73/12 – 5
Chile 11,05 90/167 40/– 17+ 3
Colombia 13,65 72/203 95/– – 8
Cubaa 8,00 44/101 14/4 NDA –
Ecuador 6,40 42/95 11/– 105+ –
El Salvador 2,00 25/46 28/– – –
Guatemalab 1,00 1/17 13/– – –
Guyana 0,20 –/6 3/– – –
Honduras 2,30 17/50 15/– 48 –
Jamaica 0,25 –/5 8/– – –
Mexico 8,00 76/265 182/– – 8
Nicaragua 1,20 –/11 9/– 18 –
Paraguay 2,75 6/39 12/– – –
Peru 9,50 77/179 70/18 NDA –
Surinam 0,20 2/3 3/– – –
The Dominican 
Republic
16,10 8/26 25/– 4 –
Trinidad 
Tobago
0,05 –/2 3/– – –
Uruguay 2,60 13/53 11/– – –
Venezuelac 11,50 82/204 30/– 440+ –
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.
a Additionally, there are 179 combat aircraft (204 units in total) and 25 helicopters ‘in–
store’, including 8 attack helicopters.
b Additionally 9 aircraft in depots.
c The number of rocket anti-aircraft has not been provided.
Source: The Military Balance 2020, 2020, pp. 398–441.
Table. 4.  
The number of soldiers and 
basic ordnance categories 
of air force of the chosen 
countries in 2020, according 
to IISS
156
Artículos y ensayos operate on various seas (up to two different ones; in the case of Mexico, on 
three) which, thus, determines the denotation of their military stature. Na-
val forces of the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Barbados, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, Brazil, Uruguay, 
Argentina and possibly Chile may operate in the Atlantic Ocean – in its nor-
thern, central and southern parts, respectively. In the Pacific operate the forces 
of Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Colombia, Ecua-
dor, Peru, Chile, and Argentina. The Navy of Mexico, Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Jamaica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Antigua and Barbuda operate on the Caribbean Sea waters. Lastly, 
Mexican and Cuban forces operate on the Mexican Bay.
Capability of naval forces5 of the countries in the region of Latin America 
and the Caribbean is varied, but not so much as land forces, or air force. Brazil, 
whose naval capability is sufficient to defend its own coast and take offensive 
actions on parts of the Atlantic Ocean with the support of its own air force, 
holds the first place in the ranking. The main assets are undoubtedly principle 
surface combatants, submarines, and universal assault ships. Limited ability 
to operate on oceans, far away from own bases and without air support might 
be treated as drawbacks. Satisfying Brazil’s power projection ambitions requi-
res to have at least one fully operational aircraft carrier. Compared to land 
forces and air force, Brazil does not have such a big advantage over the other 
countries in the region. To determine the position of these remining countries 
in the ranking is a difficult task since naval forces of Peru, Argentina, Chile, 
Venezuela, Colombia and, to some degree, Mexico all have various assets. An 
additional issue is the technical condition of ships and the level of crew’s mar-
tial training. Moreover, the Colombian, Venezuelan and Mexican naval forces 
operate on at least two different bodies of water – The Pacific, Mexican Bay, the 
Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic. Colombian assets are as follows: rank 2 regar-
ding the number of personnel, rank 4 in guardships, coastal defense and sub-
marines categories, respectively. In comparison with the other countries of the 
region Colombia does not have principal surface combatants and corvettes of 
high offensive power and its naval aviation is rather weak. The Mexican Navy 
possesses the greatest number of warships in the region, and in the category of 
personnel it is only preceded by Brazil while being comparable to Colombia’s 
forces. Mexico owns powerful naval aviation forces (excluding combat aircra-
ft) and the biggest number of guardships considerably outnumbering other 
countries in the region. This capability is enough to protect the coastal area of 
the country. The main drawback stems from the fact that the Mexican Navy 
completely lacks large offensive vessels. In respect of the number of guardships 
and coastal defense6, Venezuela is only preceded by Mexico and Chile. Their 
5  Marine corps is a crucial component of naval forces (see more Moloeznik, 2018, pp. 147–160).
6  On the 30th of March 2020 patrol ship ANBV „Naiguá” of Venezuelan naval forces sank 
trying to ram passenger ship RCGS “Resolute” (see Venezuelan Navy, 2020).
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fleet includes frigates and submarines. As a drawback, one must notice the 
relatively weak naval aviation and a small number of submarines. Taking into 
the account the quality of naval units, Peruvian forces are considerable. The 
country’s Navy has the biggest number of submarines at its disposal, quite a lot 
of frigates, corvettes and guardships. On the scale of the region, it has the cru-
cial offensive advantages. Compared to Peru, Chile has significantly fewer cor-
vettes, yet the number of guardships is considerably bigger – the second place 
in the region. Argentinian naval forces possess substantial offensive power, 
yet its shortcomings can be found in the small number of guardships, coastal 
defense and submarines. The Navy of Ecuador and Uruguay have lower naval 
capabilities. Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic 
have a large number of guardships and coastal defense vessels which enables 
them to take defensive actions and to take control over bodies of water. Anti-
gua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, as well as Nicaragua, Surinam, 
Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras occupy a very low position in 
the region (see Table 5). Naval forces of Latin America and the Caribbean are 
characterized by a relatively large number of surface combatants, corvettes 
and above all, guardships and coastal defense ships, including the ocean-going 
ones. Taking into the consideration the size of the countries of the region, 
their naval forces can be described as at least average. The naval forces of Bra-
zil, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and to a limited 
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Artículos y ensayos Paramilitary forces ranking
Paramilitary structures with their personnel and military equipment reinforce 
the armed forces of the countries in the region considerably. First of all, para-
military forces could be described as the so-called „second army” since in the 
majority of the countries paramilitary formations are very well-developed7. 
Secondly, in the case of Costa Rica and Panama the whole national defense is 
grounded on them. Furthermore, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barba-
dos, Nicaragua, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Guyana do not 
have such forces (since 2013). According to IISS data, the military stature of 
paramilitary formations in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
was greatly varied between 2008–2020. The most numerous paramilitary for-
ces could be found in Brazil – 386,000–395,000 personnel. On the scale of the 
region, significant forces could also be found in Venezuela8– 150,000–220,000 
(since 2016), Colombia – 144,000–188,000, Mexico – 31,000–132,000. 
In  other countries, including Peru with 77,000–84,000 of personnel, and 
Chile (38,000–45,000), there are greater disproportions. Lower positions are 
occupied by: Bolivia (37,000), Argentina (31,000), Cuba (27,000), Panama 
(12,000–26,000), Guatemala (19,000–25,000), El Salvador (12,000–17,000), 
Paraguay and the Dominican Republic (15,000 each). Smaller forces belong to 
Costa Rica (10,000) and Honduras (8,000), followed by scarce forces of Ecua-
dor (400–1,000), Uruguay (900–1,000), Belize (100), Haiti (50–2,700), and 
Guyana (2,000 – between 2008–2012) (see Table 6).
Consequently, certain regularities can be observed in the analyzed period. 
Firstly, no process of increasing or decreasing the number of personnel took 
place in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean – except for Mexi-
co (to a small extent). Secondly, the reduction in personnel occurred in Haiti 
(since 2009 it was quite considerable), in Peru (since 2009 – it remained at 
the same level since then), and in the already mentioned Guyana. Thirdly, 
comparing 2008 to 2020, one must notice that the number of paramilitary 
formations increased in Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, Chile, Panama, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Ecuador, Uruguay, Belize. In other countries of the 
region, it remained the same. The largest increase in the number of personnel 
in paramilitary formations was noted in Venezuela – from 0 to 220,000, and 
Mexico – from 31,000 to 132,000, which happened at the cost of regular armed 
forces. The National Guard was supposed to become the elite force responsible 
for fighting the organized crime (see Derwich, 2019, p. 146). Fourthly, in Bra-
zil, Venezuela, Bolivia (all since 2016), Guatemala and Paraguay paramilitary 
formations are numerically superior to the armed forces (see Table 1 and 6). 
7  According to IISS, only those that are trained and equipped in the same way as regular 
armed forces and are under military command belong to this group.
8  One must notice the existence of armed, pro-governmental, paramilitary groups – the so-
called colectivos, named after Chavez’s groups (see Hinz, 2019, pp. 21–23; Surdel, 2019, p. 196).
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Table 6.  
The number of personnel in 
paramilitary formations of 
the chosen countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean 
between 2008–2020, 
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Table 7.  
Personnel and military 
equipment of paramilitary 
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According to IISS, in 2020 there were 395,000 personnel in the Brazilian 
paramilitary forces (the National Forces of Public Security). The equipment 
included 3 UAVs. Brazil was the leader in the region as far as the stature of pa-
ramilitary forces goes. Venezuela, whose National Bolivarian Militia amoun-
ted to 220,000 (in addition, the existence of colectivos must be borne in mind, 
here)9, held the second place. Colombia, with its 187,900 personnel, as well 
as helicopters and aircraft, is third (National Colombian Police), followed by 
Mexico – 132,400 personnel and helicopters, aircraft, UAVs. Peru, Chile, Bo-
livia, and Argentina had significantly smaller forces. In lower positions there 
were: El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Costa Rica, and Hondu-
ras. In the case of other countries, paramilitary forces were considerably sma-
ller, or even scarce. On the other hand, it must be said that the largest number 
of military equipment was stored in depots in Argentina (including ACVs, 
artillery, aircraft, helicopters, patrol, coastal defense, logistics and support 
combatants). Considerable attention should also be drawn to the paramilitary 
stature of Peru, Chile, Cuba, and Ecuador. In the region, Costa Rica and Pana-
ma possess average number of paramilitary forces; however, one must admit 
that this is the wholistic military capability of both countries (see Table 7).
Conclusions
Total military position of the Latin America and Caribbean countries is very 
varied. The situation is even more complicated because some countries started 
modernizing military equipment, thus, improving its quality. This is connec-
ted with procurements made by the countries involved and also with geogra-
phical conditions. What is more, some counties have been trying to introduce 
standards of democratic control to their armies, which results in their level of 
professionalism being raised. Moreover, in the region, there is a kind of on-
going “specific” armament race. It must be stressed at this point that one of the 
biggest shortcomings of Latin American and the Caribbean countries stems 
from the fact that they lack adequate air force and combat air force – especia-
lly up-to-date multi-role fighters – as well as because of a generally very low 
stature of air force. What is more, the region features well-developed parami-
litary formations which play a significant role in helping maintain the existing 
political systems and internal security level in these countries.
Hypotheses which we formulated in the introduction seem to have been 
confirmed. Considering the wholistic military capability, international and 
regional stature of Latin American and the Caribbean countries could be 
“arbitrarily” described on 10 separate levels. Brazil, which dominates in the 
region, is ranked first. Brazil’s capability is mainly determined by the size of 
9  They received weapons from the authorities – there may be dozens beyond control of the 
security services (see Hinz, 2019, pp. 21–23; Surdel, 2019, p. 196).
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Artículos y ensayos its armed forces, the standing of land forces and military formations, and, to 
a smaller extent, the stature of the navy and air force. Therefore, Brazil can in-
dependently defend its territory and it also has the capacity to deploy abroad, 
which gives it the status of a regional military power. Level two, despite some 
disproportions, comprises Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. Their military 
position is weaker than that of Brazil but, compared to other countries in Latin 
America, it is higher or much higher. Colombia’s high position results from 
the size of its land forces, paramilitary formations, and the navy; the biggest 
drawbacks being the lack of armored and mechanized forces. Mexico holds 
rank number 3 which is mainly because it has sizeable land forces, parami-
litary formations and, to some extent, naval forces. The biggest disadvantage 
is its weaker air force position – especially the lack of multipurpose fighters 
and heavy weapons. Venezuela (rank 4) is a rather problematic case since its 
military stature is influenced mainly by quantitative factors, such as the num-
ber of land forces and paramilitary formations (excluding these, Venezuela 
would be ranked 5th or 6th) and also, to some extent, air force and naval for-
ces. The biggest issue seems to be the difficulty in determining the morale of 
armed forces and the technical condition of military equipment – especially 
the operational capabilities of combat air force. Armed forces of the level two 
countries can operate independently to provide national security – however, 
they meet certain difficulties in protecting their borders and controlling the 
hard-to-reach areas. On the third level, the following countries can be found: 
Peru (rank 5), Argentina and Chile (rank 6 and 7 respectively). These countries 
exhibit considerable military capability in the region, which enables them to 
take defensive actions against external threats. Peru, in particular, stands out 
in this group. Level 4 consists of the following countries: Bolivia (8), Ecuador 
(9) and Cuba (10). Their military ranking could be described as average. On 
the fifth level, there are: Uruguay (11), Guatemala (12) and the Dominican Re-
public (13). These countries’ military position in the region is below average. 
The sixth level is occupied by: Honduras (14), Paraguay (15), El Salvador (16) 
and Panama (17). These countries have limited military capability, hence their 
rather low military strength. In the seventh group we can find: Nicaragua, Ja-
maica, and Costa Rica (ranks 18–20). Their military stature is low. This group 
is followed by level 8 countries, which are: Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and 
Surinam (ranks 21–23). Level 9 countries with a very low military position 
are: the Bahamas, Barbados and Belize (24–26). These countries have a very 
limited ability to independently defend themselves against threats. The tenth 
and last group of countries comprises: Antigua and Barbuda (27) and Haiti 
(28). Their military stature could be described as merely symbolic; hence they 
cannot independently provide their national security. 
However, there exists a range of unknown factors, such as the level of trai-
ning and morale of soldiers and the army personnel. The second issue revolves 
around the operational capabilities (operational readiness) of air force and, to 
some extent, naval forces of the countries in the region. The character of Latin 
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America and the Caribbean relates to a “specific” democratic control exerci-
sed over the armed forces. Separate, yet equally crucial issue, which needs to 
be investigated and researched, revolves around the redefinition of the role of 
military personnel representatives in the countries of the region. It is mainly 
connected with the “deterioration of democracy” and the re-appearance of mili-
tary men as important, “new-old” entities on the political scene of the countries 
of the region.
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